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In light of the shortage of healthcare professionals, many developing countries operate a de 
facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which Community Health Workers 
(CHWs) supplement service provision by fully qualified physicians. CHWs are relatively 
inexpensive to train but can treat only a limited range of medical conditions. This paper 
explicitly models a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal 
allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, and implications for population 
health outcomes. We analyze how medical migration alters resource allocation and 
population health outcomes, shifting resources towards training CHWs. In the model, 
migration stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness severity spectrum, 
improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical 
conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off. It is further shown that 
donor countries must be reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians 
in order to restore aggregate population health to the pre-migration level , assuming that there 
are increasing marginal costs in involved in replacing migrating physicians.  
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The steady increase in life expectancy experienced over the twentieth century is 
unprecedented in the broad sweep of history. As recently reviewed in Cutler, Deaton and 
Lleras-Muney (2006), average life expectancy at birth increased by almost 30 years in this 
period. Nonetheless, a gap of 30 years persists at present between the average life expectancy 
in rich and poor countries. While this gap is partly attributable to income growth disparities, 
the bulk of the recent economic literature emphasizes the role of countries' institutional 
ability and political willingness to adopt and make existing healthcare technologies accessible 
to populations, as shown in Deaton (2011, 2013). This encompasses both quantity and 
quality of care provided by health care systems, as shown by recent evidence (for example, 
Banerjee et al, 2004 and references therein).  
 
This view is broadly consistent with the marked differences in the burden of disease borne 
by high and low income countries, reflected in the leading causes of mortality shown in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Leading causes of death in high and low income countries 
 
 






Fraction total Fraction total
I. Communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions and nutritional 
deficiencies
0.07 0.58
Infectious and parasitic diseases 0.02 0.34
   Tuberculosis 0.00 0.04
   HIV/AIDS 0.00 0.08
   Diarrhoeal diseases 0.00 0.08
   Childhood diseases 0.00 0.01
   Malaria 0.00 0.05
   Other 0.20 0.07
Respiratory infections 0.04 0.11
Maternal conditions 0.00 0.02
Perinatal conditions 0.00 0.09
Nutritional deficiencies 0.00 0.02
II. Noncommunicable conditions 0.87 0.33
Cancer 0.26 0.05
Diabetes mellitus 0.03 0.02
Cardiovascular diseases 0.37 0.16
III. Injuries 0.06 0.09
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Infectious and parasitic diseases, such as tuberculosis, diarrheal disease and malaria account 
for around 35 percent of deaths in low income countries and less than 2 per cent in high 
income countries. Maternal and perinatal mortality account for more than 10 percent of 
deaths in low income countries and less than 1 percent of mortality in rich countries. Hence, 
with the exception of HIV infection, the most prevalent conditions in low income countries 
are treatable (and some preventable) using existing drugs, treatments and public health 
interventions, most of them relatively inexpensive and not requiring cutting-edge equipment 
and infrastructure. 
 
The World Health Report 2006 (WHO, 2006) acknowledges that the provision of relatively 
simple and inexpensive life-saving interventions, such as antenatal care, immunization and 
treatment of diarrhea, tuberculosis and malaria, is seriously constrained by a shortage of 
health workers in the developing world. Table 2 shows the density per 10,000 of population, 
of fully qualified doctors in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2004.  
 
Table 2: Density of doctors per 10,000 of population and medical emigration rates in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Data on physician density and emigration used in Bhargava and Docquier (2008, 2012) 



















Sierra Leone 0.73 9






With the exception of South Africa, all the countries listed fall considerably short of the 
minimum requirements set by the WHO (2006) as a pre-requisite for the accomplishment of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although a causality nexus cannot be inferred 
from the table, it also shows that many of these countries experience high rates of physician 
emigration, many of them higher than 20% of the total number of fully qualified doctors in 
the country.  
 
To address this shortage of qualified doctors, many developing countries systematically train 
and deploy Community Health Workers (CHWs) - a strategy recommended by the WHO 
(2006). These countries operate a de facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which 
CHWs, recruited from their communities and swiftly trained, supplement service provision 
by fully qualified physicians. CHW programs have attracted growing attention in the recent 
economic development literature (see Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee, 2013 and references 
therein), but have not yet been systematically analyzed in health economics.  
 
We explicitly model a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision, characterize the optimal 
allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs and deduce implications for 
population health outcomes. As shown in Table 2, many of the countries that operate this 
type of system experience high emigration rates of fully qualified doctors. We analyze how 
such migration affects resource allocation and population health outcomes, by altering the 
effective cost of training doctors, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. We 
show that this resource reallocation may benefit patients affected by illnesses treated by 
CHWs, rendering worse-off sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions, which can only 
be treated by fully qualified physicians. Finally, we show that donor countries must be 
reimbursed by more than the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore 
aggregate population health to its pre-migration level. This compensatory payment does not 
prevent host countries from continuing to benefit from the importation of doctors.  
 
2. Community health workers 
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The term 'Community Health Worker' is a blanket term used to describe lay members of the 
community who provide health services, following a short and targeted period of training3. 
China’s “barefoot doctors” are arguably the first and most well-known of this type of health 
worker. Launched in the 1950s, that program aimed at training lay community members to 
provide primary health care in rural areas, where few qualified doctors wished to settle. The 
Chinese example spawned a diverse range of healthcare programs throughout the developing 
world: a (non-exhaustive) list of countries that rely significantly on CHWs for health care 
provision is given in Table 3 according to a recent WHO report (WHO, 2010).  
 
Table 3: Alternative designations for CHWs in developing countries 
 
    Source: WHO (2010) 
                                                
3 According to Lehmann and Sanders (2007), the most widely accepted definition of CHW is the one proposed 
in WHO (1989): “Community health workers should be members of the community where they work, 
answerable to the communities for their activities, supported by the health system but not necessarily a part of 
its organization, and have shorter training than professional workers”. 
Coutry CHWs 
Bangladesh Shasthyo Sebika
Peru Agente Comunitario de Salud
Pakistan Lady Heath Workers
India Saksham Sahaya, Maternal & Child Health Promotion Workers amongst others
Brazil Community Health Agents
Burkina Faso Women Group Leaders
Burma Maternal Health Worker
Nepal Female Community Health Worker
Ethiopia Village Malaria Worker & Mother Coordinators
Ecuador Malaria erradication workers







Senegal  Nutrition Worker
Uganda Community Drug Distributor
Kenya Village Health Helper
Indonesia Kader Posyandu
Mali Village Drug-Kit Manager
South Africa Lay Health Worker
Uganda  Community Reproductive Health Worker
Guatemala Village Health Promoters
Nicaragua Brigadistas
6
Known by a wide range of country-specific designations, CHWs receive different forms of 
training and provide different types of care across countries. In most cases, however, their 
length of training varies from 6 months to two years and is therefore limited to a subset of 
conditions that a fully qualified doctor can treat.  Systematic reviews of healthcare programs 
based on CHWs, such as WHO (2010) and Lehmann and Sanders (2007), highlight their 
involvement in outreach activities and curative care in the areas shown in Figure 1. 
Predictably, these mirror the leading conditions contributing to the burden of disease 
highlighted in Table 1: a comprehensive range of highly prevalent conditions whose 
treatment rarely requires a fully qualified medical doctor and complex healthcare technology.  
Figure 1. Main activities of CHWs in developing countries  
 
Source: Lehmann and Sanders (2007) 
An important characteristic of CHWs is that they are members of the community in which 
they work. They are thus less likely to attrite and, crucially in our analysis, cannot emigrate 
and work as health professionals abroad, since their qualifications are not valid outside their 
country4.  
4 There is not an international market for CHWs since they are required to have profound knowledge of the 
local communities, including knowledge of language and culture.   
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3. Medical migration 
 
Medical migration is frequently identified in the literature as a leading cause of poor health 
outcomes (Bundred and Levitt, 2000) and short supply of healthcare (for example Ashton et 
al., 2005) in developing countries. This view is generally shared by health policy officials and 
officially endorsed by the WHO (World Health Report, 2006  - Chapter 5). It has been 
rightly argued, as noted in Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), that the positive impact 
of a higher retention of health professionals in donor countries on population health might 
be hampered by the lack of complementary investments in drugs, equipment and 
infrastructure that is endemic at present in many developing countries. Nonetheless, a 
sufficient supply of health professionals remains a fundamental pre-requisite for sizable 
improvements in health outcomes to be within reach, both in the short and the longer run. 
 
Moreover, the majority of doctors who migrate from developing countries relocate to rich 
countries. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of doctors trained abroad (most frequently in 
developing countries) represents roughly one-third of the doctors practicing in the USA, 
Canada, UK and Australia, and a significant share of other rich countries’ medical labor 
force. Training of medical doctors is expensive even in developing countries: recent 
estimates in Mills et al (2011) of the cost of fully training a doctor in Sub-Saharan Africa 
range from $21,000 in Uganda to about $60,000 in South Africa, a cost which, in poor 
countries, is typically borne by the government. Medical migration therefore implies a partial 
loss of human capital investment, which is transferred free of charge to the host country, a 
situation often deemed unfair, as argued in the World Health Report, 2006 – p.101:   (…) 
when large numbers of doctors and nurses leave, the countries that financed their education lose a return on 
their investment and end up unwillingly providing the wealthy countries to which their health personnel have 
migrated with a kind of “perverse subsidy” 
 
 
Table 4: Doctors trained abroad as percentage of practicing doctors, in select OECD countries 
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    Source: WHO (2006) 
 
3.1 Theoretical models 
The idea that the attraction of the scarce skilled labor force of developing countries by rich 
countries is fundamentally unfair has been the focus of the theoretical literature on the brain 
drain since the late 1960s. As reviewed in Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2002) and, 
more recently, in Docquier and Rapoport (2012), the 1970s theoretical literature examines 
the welfare implications of this brain drain and emphasizes its detrimental effect on 
developing countries. Stylized models of labor market integration developed in Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974, 1975), Rodriguez (1975) and McCulloch and Yellen (1977) indicate that, in 
the presence of labor market rigidities, imperfect information, externalities and subsidized 
education in developing countries, emigration of skilled workers affects developing countries 
negatively. It hinders human capital formation, imposes on them important fiscal costs 
associated with public provision of education, and, under specific circumstances, may further 
lead to an increase in unemployment5. In order to compensate developing countries for 
these negative effects, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) proposed an income tax paid by skilled 
emigrants – the much discussed Bhagwati tax. This would be paid over and above their 
income tax in the host country and the corresponding tax revenue transferred to the donor 
country. The debate on the consequences of this proposal, as well as the relative merits of 
different variations on the Bhagwati tax is ongoing6.  
 
A more recent wave of theoretical models pioneered in the late 1990’s re-examines the issue 
of brain drain in the context of dynamic models and proposes that migration may provide 
                                                
5 Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) show that, under certain conditions, the possibility of emigration lead the 
skilled workers of developing countries to bargain for higher wages, leading to an increase of unemployment.  










significant positive incentives for skill formation, which might, in net terms, mitigate or even 
outweigh the loss of human capital that occurs through emigration. Amongst the seminal 
contributions to this line of research are Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998) and Beine, 
Docquier and Rapoport (2001). Further theoretical contributions have emphasized 
additional possible benefits, neglected by the earlier literature, such as migrants’ remittances, 
which are a source of development finance in developed countries. This literature is 
thoroughly reviewed in Docquier and Rapoport (2012).  
 
The theoretical literature to date has thus largely focused on characterizing the implications 
of migration of highly qualified individuals on those left behind and on human capital 
formation dynamics in the donor country, which in turn can impact on its economic growth. 
In this paper, we abstract from the question of how medical migration impacts on wages of 
remaining medical personnel in the donor country, and focus instead on its impact on health 
outcomes, both directly through the loss of qualified medical personnel, and indirectly, 
through the endogenous shift in the allocation of public spending for the training of medical 
personnel. To address this issue we explicitly model how both the level of expenditure on 
health professional training and its allocation across CHWs and physicians impacts on health 
outcomes, both in the aggregate and along the health status distribution. For parsimony and 
in line with the first wave of literature on the brain drain, the proportion of emigrating 
physicians is treated as exogenous.  
 
3.2 Evidence 
There is an extensive empirical literature on the overall effect of medical migration on 
population health outcomes in donor countries. As data are relatively scarce, causal effects 
are hard to establish and evidence is mixed. Despite these limitations, some associations are 
well established. Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps (2008) show that medical migration is 
associated with a worsening of child health outcomes in a panel of 98 host countries; 
interestingly, their results further suggest that medical brain drain reduces the effectiveness 
of foreign health aid to these countries. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) corroborate the 
existence of a negative association between the migration of doctors and key population 
outcomes: doubling the rate of expatriation of fully qualified doctors is associated with a 20 
percent increase in adult deaths from AIDS.  
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While we focus on a distinct new channel through which medical migration can have a 
detrimental effect on aggregate population health, the economic literature has also 
emphasized channels for potential gain from migration, as mentioned above.  First, medical 
migration generates remittances: Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander (2007) examine a 
survey of overseas doctors practicing in the UK in 20027; on average 45% of these doctors 
sent remittances, on the order of 16% of their earnings, to their families in the donor 
country. Although remittances may represent a significant source of income for some 
families in donor countries, they do not directly improve health care quality, availability and 
population health. Hence, we abstract from these in our model.  
 
Second, doctors who emigrate may return with potentially valuable skills. Although 
international data are insufficient for a rigorous assessment, Kangasniemi, Winters and 
Commander (2007) provide useful evidence. Of the migrant doctors who reported to have 
the intention to return to their donor countries, roughly 65% intended to work in the private 
sector and almost 90% in urban areas. Returnees are thus unlikely to populate the most 
impoverished areas in need of care. Moreover, given that 70 per cent of the burden of 
disease in low-income countries is amenable to simple interventions, the relevance of newly 
acquired skills in rich countries has been called into question. Overall, the evidence on the 
hypothesized benefits of a return of doctors who emigrate is, at best, weak. Thus, for 
simplicity, we abstract from this possibility in our model.  
 
Finally, the recent empirical literature focuses on the plausibility theoretical possibility of 
'brain gain', in the sense that the prospect of migration may increase incentives to obtain 
education, thereby improving, rather than depleting, the stock of human capital. Our model 
analyses resource allocation in the context of a fairly limited health budget, where the state 
selects how many doctors to train from a sufficiently large, homogeneous pool of potential 
candidates. We abstract from the possibility of a shortage of possible individuals to train, 
assuming health-budget constraints bind. This assumption is plausible given the financial 
                                                
7 The main donor countries represented in the sample were India (around 42%), Nigeria (8%) and South Africa 
(roughly 7%).  Other Sub-Saharan Africa countries were also represented.  
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constraints in developing countries, and because the empirical evidence suggests brain gain 
effects are too small to affect the national stock of doctors8.  
 
4. The model 
This section presents a model of disease and optimal resource allocation to treat it using two 
types of medical personnel, with and without medical migration. It aims at analyzing the 
effect of medical migration on health outcomes, both directly through the loss of qualified 
medical personnel, and indirectly, through the endogenous shift in the allocation of public 
spending for the training of medics. This sheds light on the relative strength of the 
mechanisms at play in different scenarios and the quantification of possible compensatory 
measures. It can also be a basis for empirical work, once more detailed data on CHWs is 
compiled and made available9.  
 
We explicitly adopt a social planner’s perspective as we consider it to be particularly relevant 
in our context. In most developing countries, the overwhelming majority of medical training 
is funded and most often provided by the state: according to a large recent survey funded by 
the Gates foundation  - Mullan et. al. (2010) – in Sub-Saharan Africa over 80 percent of 
medical school of all kinds are public and their curricula decided in light of local health 
issues and priorities. Moreover, attendance at the minority of private schools operating in the 
region is often heavily subsidized by the state. Mullan et al. (2010) also suggests that, in most 
countries, budget constraints are clearly binding and constitute a severe obstacle to scaling-
up health professionals’ education10. Finally, the adoption a social planner’s perspective is 
                                                
8 Mountford (1997) shows that brain gain hinges on two crucial premises: that migration prospects determine 
decisions to enroll into medical school and that migrants are not strongly screened by the host country. 
Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander (2007) find that, for medical migration towards the UK, the link 
between migration possibility educational choices is likely to be weak and that host countries clearly cream-
skim the best applicants; neither of the two crucial premises is thus likely to hold. Bhargava, Docquier and 
Moullan (2011) find only a small positive effect of migration prospects on the decision to undertake medical 
training, clearly insufficient to generate a sizable effect on a county’s stock of doctors. As noted in Docquier 
and Rapoport (2012), curtailing medical brain drain would, overall, increase staffing levels in developing 
countries. 
9 At the moment, simple estimates of the number of CHWs and their patients vary widely according to the 
source of information. Important efforts are nonetheless being undertaken in order to compile such data (for, 
for example by the One Million CHWs campaign: http://1millionhealthworkers.org  ).
10 Budgetary constrains are associated with endemic shortages within medical and health science school 
faculties, lack of equipment and essential infrastructure maintenance. This, in turn, limits the number of health 
professionals, such as doctors and CHWs, trained in Sub-Saharan African countries.   
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further justified by official WHO recommendations, the bottom line conclusion of which is 
that “Only broad and inclusive multi-sectoral planning at the national level will allow the coordination 
necessary to effectively scale up numbers and align health professional education with country health needs”, 
WHO (2011, p.18). 
 
4.1 Model set-up 
Consider a population that suffers from illnesses of varying severity, denoted by s , where 
s 1, ) .  Let the health status of an individual with illness of severity s be 1s . Perfect 
health is the state valued at unity, where s = 1, and health status tends to zero as illness 
severity tends to infinity. Moreover, the distribution of the severity of illness in the 
population is given by a cumulative distribution function F(s) , defined on [1, ) . 
 
We assume there are two kinds of health worker: doctors and Community Health Workers 
(CHWs).   Doctors are indexed as type 1 and CHWs as type 2.  A health worker of type i, 
where i 1,2{ } , provides care of quality qi , where q1 > q2 . CHWs are capable of treating 
illnesses in the interval [1, ŝ] , while doctors are capable of treating all illnesses.  If a health 
worker of type i  expends time t  treating a patient with illness of severity s , the health status 





Thus, to bring a patient to full health, when she is treated by a health worker of type i , 
requires a treatment time of: 
    t = s 1
qi
. (2) 
The time required is inversely proportional to the quality of the health worker. The cost of 
training a health care worker of type i  is ci . Define the quality-adjusted cost as ri = ci / qi .  
We assume that:  
 r1 > r2.  (3) 
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Inequality (2) is the usual assumption that producing a valued output (in this case, quality of 
care) comes at increasing marginal cost. We denote the budget available for training health 
care workers by M , measured in country per capita terms.  If mi  is the fraction of the 
population trained to be a health care worker of type i , then the budget constraint is: 
 
 c1m1 + c2m2 M . (4) 
mi  can be interpreted as the man-hours available to provide health care services of type i  to 
the population. The total time spent on patients by health workers of type i  must therefore 
not exceed mi . 
 
We measure social welfare (as far as health is concerned) as the mean of the logarithms of 
the health statuses of the population11. Define the post-treatment health status of an individual 
with illness of severity s  as h(s) ; of course, this depends upon the type of health worker 
assigned to him, and the time spent on treatment.  The social objective is then:  
 W = logh(s)dF(s)
1
, (5) 
and the optimization problem is to decide how many doctors and CHWs to train, and how 
to assign them to treating patients with various severities of disease. Note that, if everyone in 
the population were brought to full health, then post-treatment health status would be 
h(s) =1  for all, and the expression in (5) would be zero. Therefore, in general, the 
expression in (5) is negative, and we can therefore view W  as the post-treatment burden of 
disease in the population, for this is the precisely the amount by which disease reduces the 
welfare of the population. Using this terminology, we can view  
 logh(s)dF(s) log(1/ s)dF(s)
11
 (6) 
as the amount by which the burden of disease in the society is reduced by health care. 
  
A preliminary step for allocating resources optimally is the observation that: 
                                                
11 More on the choice of the objective below.
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Lemma 1 Optimal use of health care resources implies that CHWs treat only patients with illness severity 
in [1, ŝ]  and doctors treat only illnesses with severity in the interval (ŝ, ) .  
 
The first part of Lemma 1 is true by definition, since CHWs are incapable of treating 
illnesses more severe than ŝ . It is the second part that is substantive; doctors will only treat 
more severe illness. Intuitively, the increasing marginal cost of quality implies it is always 
more cost-effective to allocate CHWs to less severe cases12. For the proof of Lemma 1 and  
subsequent theorems see the Appendix. 
 
The complete resource allocation problem is to choose functions t1( ),  t2( )  and numbers 


















           ( 2 )
(ii)  t1(s)dF(s) m1                           ( 1)
ŝ
(iii)   1+ q1t1(s) s, s (ŝ, )             ( (s))
(iv)   1+ q2t2(s) s, s [1, ŝ]              ( (s))
t1(s) 0, t2(s) 0
(v)   c1m1 + c2m2 M                               ( )
          (7)
  
We define: 




                                                
12 It is interesting that this result applies generally, for all budget levels and distributions of illness, hinging on 
the increasing marginal cost of quality of healthcare. This may explain why CHWs are trained and deployed 
also in rich countries, such as the USA. 
13 The objective function of program (7) can be written this way by Lemma 1. 
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where Q  is a ‘truncated mean’ function. It is now possible to characterize the optimal 
resource allocation under certain premises. In particular: 
 
Proposition 1 Suppose that:




r2F ŝ( ) + r1 1 F ŝ( )( )( ) < M < r2Q ŝ( ) r2F ŝ( ) + r1 1 F ŝ( )( )( )          
Then the solution to program (7) is given by: 
 
t2(s) =
(s 1) / q2 , s [1,s
*]








, s (ŝ, )
 (9) 
where s*   is the unique solution of the equation: 
  
 M = r2Q(s
*) r2F(ŝ)+ r1(1 F(ŝ)( ).  (10) 
The values of (m1,m2 )  are given by constraints (i) and (ii) in program (7), both of which are binding at the 
solution. 
  
Qualitatively, Proposition 1 states that, under premises (i)-(ii), the optimal solution has the 
following features: there is a severity s*  in the interval [1, ŝ]  such that CHWs spend 
sufficient time on those with illness severities s [1,s*]  to completely cure them (i.e. raising 
their health status to 1); for any illness with severity in the interval (s*, ŝ)  CHWs spend a 
fixed, unvarying amount of time (and so these patients are not brought up to full health). 
Doctors treat all patients with illness more severe than ŝ , but again spend a constant 
16
amount of time on each case, and bring none of these patients up to full health.   Note, in 
particular, that all patients receive treatment at the optimal solution. 
 The last sentence provides a justification for why we choose to maximize the average 
logarithm of post-treatment health status.   If we had instead maximized the average post-
treatment health status (not logged), then, it turns out, the optimal solution entails that 
patients at each illness severity s are either brought up to perfect health or are not treated at all.    
Because we never observe this kind of bang-bang solution, it is more realistic to apply a 
concave transformation to health status to form the health ministry’s objective.  
 Proposition 1 presents the solution to program (7) when the parameters of the 
problem are in a set defined by premise (ii).   As is usual for such problems, there will be 
different solutions to the program, depending upon precisely what the vector of parameters 
is.    We do not attempt to provide a full characterization of the optimal solution for any 
possible parameter vector: our task here is not to advise fully the health ministry, but to 
show certain characteristics of the solution.   Condition (ii) says that the budget M   is not 
too large and not too small.  It is difficult to understand why the condition takes this 
particular form without reading the proof. 
 
We consider an example, with F(s) = 1 1
s
 and f (s) = 1
s2
, where f  is the density of F . 
Set (ŝ,c1,q1,c2,q2,r1,r2 ) = (3,20,10.526,5,5,1.9,1) . Premise (ii) holds precisely when: 
0.342 < M < 0.799.           
Set M = 0.51 . Then solving (10) gives s* = 2.248 .  Note that F(ŝ) = 2
3
, so CHWs treat that 
fraction of the population.  All patients with illnesses of severity less 2.248 are fully cured by 
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treatment from CHWs.  These comprise 55.5% of the population.  The remaining patients 
with illness of greater severity are treated, but not restored to full health.  The optimal 
supplies of the two kinds of medical personnel are m1 = 0.58% and m2 = 7.9% , reported in 
population-percentage terms.   In this example, there are many more CHWs than physicians. 
 We plot the pre-treatment and post-treatment health-status, as a function of s, for 
the numerical example at the optimal solution, in Figure 2.   There are three regions: for 
s < s*= 2.248 , CHWs treat patients to full health; in the region s*< s < ŝ = 3 , CHWs spend 
the same amount of time on each patient, improving health status but not restoring patients 
to full health; finally, for s > ŝ , patients are treated by doctors, who spend an equal amount 
of time on each patient, again not bringing their patients up to full health. There is a saltus 
downward of health status at ŝ , from (s* / ŝ)  to 
r2
r1
(s* / ŝ) .    
   
 
Figure 2.  Health status, before treatment (light curve) and after treatment (dark curve) at the 





In general, social welfare at the optimal solution can be computed based on equation (5) and 
is given by: 
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It is interesting that health status takes a saltus downward at ŝ = 3  . So patients whose illness 
is slightly less severe than  are ‘significantly’ better off, treated by the CHW, than patients 
whose illness is slightly more severe than , who are treated by the doctor. This will not be 
the case for all possible problems. Proposition 1 only characterizes the optimal solution for 
problems characterized by premise (ii). 
   
 
4.2 Medical migration  
This section examines comparative statics of the optimal solution characterized in 
Proposition 1 in the context of outward medical migration of doctors, who are trained at 
public expense, but then take jobs in rich countries. In contrast, CHWs are assumed to 
remain geographically immobile. These assumptions are backed by the strong evidence 
presented in section 1, which points to high rates of outward migration of fully qualified 
physicians from developing countries, whereas CHWs lack the formal qualifications to fill 
medical posts abroad.  
 
Denote by  the fraction of doctors who, after training, stay in the country, and by 1  
the fraction that migrates.  The effect of migration in optimization problem (7) is simply to 
change the effective cost of training a doctor from c1 to c1 / . The effective cost of 
producing m1  doctors who stay in the country is thus c1m1 /  (i.e. if one trains m1 /  
doctors, the number who stay will be (m1 / ) = m1 ).   
 





















* / c1) (1/ q1))(1 F(ŝ)) m1 = 0  (13) 
 r2Q(s
*) (r2F(ŝ)+
r1 (1 F(ŝ)) M = 0,  (14) 
 which comprise three equations in the three unknowns s*,m1,m2( ) .   
 
Equation (12) is the binding constraint (i) of program (7) at the optimal solution, (13) is 
binding constraint (ii) of (7), and (14) is equation (10).  Throughout, c1 / has been 
substituted for c1 .  
 
The Jacobian of this system with respect to these three variables is: 








We now differentiate the three equations with respect to , which gives the vector: 
  b =
0
r2s





By the implicit function theorem, the derivatives of the optimal values of s*,m1,m2( )  with 








































This means that as  decreases from a value of one, s*  increases, and more CHWs are trained.  
Because m2  increases as  decreases, it immediately follows from the budget constraint that 
m1 > 0  , a fact that can also be calculated from (16).  In sum, we have shown: 
 
Proposition 2.  Under the premises of Proposition 1, as the fraction of migrating doctors increases from 
zero, then: 
 (a) the number of CHWs trained increases, 
 (b) the number of doctors trained decreases, 
 (c) those will illness severity s ŝ   receive more treatment in aggregate, and 
 (d) those will illness severity s > ŝ   receive less treatment. 
 
The effect on the burden of disease from migration of doctors is, of course, of key interest.  
We thus compute the effect on burden from migration. From equation (11), when migration 
is included, we can write welfare at the optimal solution as: 
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+1 F(ŝ) = (1 F(ŝ))(1
r1
r2s
* ) > 0,  (17) 
where we used the expression in (16) for ds
*
d
  and concluded the last inequality from the 
fact that s* > r1
r2










* ) / log(s







.  (18) 
   
This can be illustrated using the example described earlier. Evaluating this elasticity in that 
context gives: 
 




= 0.078 . 
 
This means that if  falls from one to 0.9, welfare will decrease (or the burden of disease 
will increase) by approximately 0.78%.  
   
In general, the effect of an increase in physician migration on the number of doctors and 
CHWs at the optimal solution for the country can be found by computing the elasticities of 


























As an illustration, in terms of our example, these elasticities evaluate to: 







= 0.403 . (21) 
 
In other words, a fall in the fraction of doctors staying in the country from unity to 0.9 
reduces the number of doctors practicing in the country by 23.7 %, at the optimal allocation, 
and increases the number of CHWs trained by 4.0%. Because of the effective increase in the 
price of training doctors, the fraction of doctors trained falls (in this example) by more than 
twice the loss due to migration.  Moreover, from the first derivative in (16), the effect of 
migration is to increase s* . The increase in the number of CHWs implies that patients with 
illnesses in the interval [0, ŝ]  actually are better off with some physician migration; they have 
more CHWs to treat them. The brunt of the increase in the burden of disease is borne 
entirely by patients with illnesses too severe for CHWs to treat. This result is comprehensible 
if we recall that the objective of program (7) is to maximize an average of ‘utilities’ in the 
population. As doctors become effectively more expensive due to the leakage of migration, it 
is optimal to substitute CHWs for doctors: but since CHWs are constrained to treat only 
relatively minor illnesses, patients with those illnesses have improved outcomes. 
 
4.2.2 Health outcomes with migration 
 
Let us return to our example. Now we incorporate outward migration by assuming 
= 0.9 and =0.75 ; that is, 10% or 25% of the doctors migrate. Solving for the new 
severity threshold and optimal resource allocation between training doctors and CHWs 
allows us to graph the post-treatment health status distribution these two levels of migration.  
We graph the post-treatment health status of the population optimal solutions with and 










Figure 3.   Health status at zero migration (dark curve) , 10% migration  (gray curve) and 25% 








The effect of migration on the post-treatment health distribution summarized in Proposition 
2 can be observed in the figure. Patients who are treated by CHWs actually do better with 
migration – that is, more of them are restored to full health. Patients whose severity is 
greater than ŝ  do worse.  In other words, migration induces the Ministry of Health to cut 
back on doctor training, and shift resources towards training more CHWs. The threshold s* 
increases with migration, as we saw in (16). The overall burden of disease, of course, 
increases – for this example from 0.6588 to 0.6637 at 10% migration, by 0.74%, which 





In general, the basic intuition behind these patterns, driven by (16), is as follows. Increasing 
migration is reflected in an increase in the effective cost of training doctors – for the cost of 
training a doctor who will be available in the country is 
c1 . Consequently, an increase in 
migration increases the relative cost of the more expensive healthcare input, and so the 
Ministry economizes by hiring fewer of them. In fact, after migration, in the optimal solution, 
the Ministry spends less in total on training doctors than before, implying more expenditure 
on training CHWs given an unchanged budget. This is why those who are not severely ill 
actually benefit from the migration of doctors. 
 
 
4.2.3 Resource allocation and health outcomes with migration and 
reimbursement  
Now suppose migrating doctors are taxed to pay back the cost of their training, or the donor 
country receives a reimbursement from the countries to which they migrate, equal to the 
cost of their training.  Migration thus increases the budget available to the Ministry to train 
doctors and CHWs, giving rise to a new optimal resource allocation.  
 
Let n1   be the number of doctors who are trained.   The number who stay to practice in the 
home country is m1 = n1  .    The cost of training the physicians who migrate is c1(1 )n1  .  
We now assume that this amount is reimbursed to the Ministry of Health by the rich 
countries to which their doctors have migrated.   Therefore the budget constraint for the 
Ministry becomes: 
  c1n1 + c2m2 = M + c1(1 )n1  or c1( n1)+ c2m2 = M  .     (22) 
The new optimization program for the Ministry is exactly the same as program (7) except 
that the budget constraint (v) is replaced with equation (22) and constraint (ii) is replaced 
with: 
  t1(s)dF(s) n1.
ŝ
    (23) 
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But this new program is identical to program (7) except that m1   has been replaced with 
n1  .    Therefore,  the solution to program (7) (without migration) will be identical to the 
solution of the new program, with n1 = m1
*   , where m1
*   is the optimal supply of physicians 
in program (7), absent migration.   Thus, if the cost of training the migrants is reimbursed to 
the home country, then there will be no change in medical care or the burden of disease. 
 
However, there is an important ceteris paribus assumption hidden here – that increasing the 
number of physicians that the home country trains will not decrease the quality of trained 
physicians.  More medical schools will be needed, the applicant pool will be larger, etc., so in 
all likelihood the ceteris paribus assumption is false.    This means that, in reality, the home 
country should be reimbursed more than the cost of training the migrating physicians, if its 
burden of disease is not to increase.   
 
It is clear that if the home country is reimbursed less than the cost of training the migrants, 
then the burden of disease increases there, for this would be equivalent to decreasing the 
medical budget from the case of full reimbursement, which therefore must decrease the 




A shortage of medical personnel has been addressed in developing countries through the 
systematic training and deployment of CHWs who supplement healthcare provision by fully 
qualified doctors. Our analysis develops a model of a two-tiered structure of healthcare 
provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and 
CHWs, as well as the implications for population health outcomes. Outward medical 
migration of physicians distorts the cost of training doctors relative to geographically 
immobile CHWs, thereby shifting resources towards training CHWs. Since CHWs can only 
treat a limited range of illnesses, the additional investment in training of CHWs can only give 
rise to additional treatment of relatively low severity illness.  
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While migration increases the burden of disease in society overall, it stimulates health care 
provision at the lower end of the illness-severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for 
those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by 
doctors are made worse off14. This provides insight on an important policy debate, centered 
on whether foreign aid should be used in system-wide interventions, aimed at strengthening 
the entire health system, or, rather, on disease-specific programs, aimed at particular health 
conditions, such as AIDS or malaria (see Warren et al. 2013). Our results show that patients 
affected by diseases that require the attention of fully qualified doctors are particularly 
harmed by medical emigration. This provides a novel justification for disease-specific 
interventions. 
 
We show that, under a ceteris paribus assumption,  if the donor country is reimbursed by  the 
training cost of emigrating physicians, the overall burden of disease in society is maintained 
at its pre-migration level.  Because the ceteris paribus assumption does not take into account 
the increasing marginal costs of expanding medical schools, and the decrease in the quality 
of medical students if the applicant pool is enlarged, in reality the donor country must be 
reimbursed by more than the cost of training its migrating physicians to remain whole. 
 
In a hypothetical world where donor countries could prevent migration, the number of 
emigrating doctors and the level of reimbursement would be the outcome of a bargaining 
game between donor and host.  In such a setting, the donor country would be reimbursed by 
more than is required to restore overall population health. This provides a normative 
justification for the view that recipients of fully qualified medical personnel through 
migration should substantially compensate developing countries.  
 
In the previous sections we present this reimbursement as lump sum transfer. This need not 
be the case, as demonstrated by recent doctors retention policies, such as Malawi’s 
Emergency Human Resources Programme (EHRP). As shown in Table 2, the density of 
physicians in this country is low and, simultaneously, a large share of the doctors trained in 
                                                
14 Several middle income countries achieved important increases in life expectancy through cost-effective 
primary care provision, relying heavily on CHWs. However, this cost-effective strategy is insufficient for 
tackling more severe non-communicable diseases that typically require treatment by fully qualified doctors, as 
made clear in a recent OECD policy report about China (OECD, 2013).
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Malawi emigrate. In order to curtail this deficit of medical personnel, international partners, 
namely the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, supported Malawi by providing aid (over 100 
million dollars between 2004 and 2009) used to subsidize retention policies for doctors 
(DFID, 2010). First, EHDR provided a substantial top-up of salaried medical doctors in the 
country (roughly 50% of their before salary), in order to reduce the incentives for migration. 
Second, EDHR funded the training of medical doctors; this policy is associated15 with a large 
increase in the number of medical doctors on training in the country16.  
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Proofs of theorems are provided below. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Suppose doctors spend time  treating patients with illnesses in the interval 
.  The outcome for this group of patients is  
 . (A1)    
The cost of this treatment is . Now let , and let these 
patients be treated instead by CHWs with treatment times . The welfare outcome is 
identical but the cost of treatment is: 
  
 , (A2) 
where the inequality follows from assumption (3).  Hence it is not optimal to treat these 
patients using doctors.   
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
1.  Observe first that , so  is increasing. 
2.  The proof is based on the fact that program (7) is a convex program.  Define the 
Lagrangian function: 
      
where the functions t1(s),t2 (s)   and the numbers m1  and m2  comprise the candidate for the 
optimal solution of the program.  If we can produce a non-negative function  on  
t(s)
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ŝ




(s) s (1+ q2(t2(s)+ t2(s)))( )
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and non-negative constants  such that  at the values of these variables 
stated in the proposition, then the proposition is proved.  For this will mean that the 
concave function L is maximized at = 0 . In the Lagrangian function L the functions 
 are arbitrary feasible variations from the conjectured optimal solution, as are 
the numbers .    
2.  Evaluating the derivative at zero: 
  (A3) 
If we can choose non-negative Lagrangian multipliers ( 1, 2 , )  and a non-negative 
function (s)  on [1, s*]    so that the coefficients of are all  
annihilated, then the result is proved. 




is the function that is 1 
on , and 0 elsewhere;
 
 
4.   From  the t2   condition, we have  (s) = 2q2
+ 1
s
 for s [1, s*]  .   At s*  , we choose
(s*) = 0  , implying 2 =
q2
s*






*   and so 1 =
c1
r2s
* .   Therefore (1+ q1t1)
c1
r2s




1) / q1  .   
For t1   to be positive we require s
* > r1
r2
 , which we will attend to below.  We must also 
( 1, 2 , ) L (0) = 0

















) (c1 m1 + c2 m2 ) (s)q2 t2(s)dF(s).
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m1 : 1 c1 = 0
m2 : 2 c2 = 0
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check that we are not treating patients with illness severityt s > ŝ   with more treatment than 
they require:  that is, we want 1+ q1t1 ŝ  .    But this is true because s
* < ŝ < r1
r2
ŝ  . 
















dF(s) = M  . 
This can be written as : 
 r2 (s 1)dF(s)+ r2 (s
* 1)(F(ŝ) F(s*))+ (r2s




which in turn is equivalent to condition (10) defining s*  .   Finally, our premise (ii) is exactly 
the condition that tells us a unique solution s*  exists to equation such that 
r1
r2
< s* < ŝ  .   
This is so because the function Q is monotone increasing, and the existence of s*   therefore 
follows from  condition (ii) by the intermediate value theorem.   
 
